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Over the past four years . . .we have witnessed the birth
of a new breed of political animal-the kangaroo grand jury
-spawned in a dark corner of the Department of Justice,
nourished by an administration bent on twisting law enforce-
ment to serve its own political ends, a dangerous modern
form of star chamber secret inquisition that is trampling the
rights of American citizens from coast to coast.1
Introduction
ON April 16, 1975, an attorney in New York received a call from
an FBI agent; the agent asked for the address of one of the attorney's
clients. Upon the attorney's refusal to furnish the address, the agent
stated that in order to get the information, he would have the attorney
subpoenaed before a federal grand jury. Eight days later the agent
arrived at the lawyer's office with a subpoena issued by the assistant
United States attorney commanding that the lawyer appear before a
federal grand jury the following morning. In the suit that followed, the
United States attorney told the court that the grand jury would ask the
lawyer for the home and work addresses and phone numbers of the
client.' The Center for Constitutional Rights and the National Lawyers
Guild filed amicus briefs on behalf of the attorney. The district court
quashed the subpoena on May 22.1
* B.A., 1964, University of Rochester; J.D., 1968, Yale University. Assistant
Professor of Law, University of San Francisco.
1. Hearings on Grand Jury before Subcomm. 1 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973) (testimony of Senator Edward M. Kennedy).
2. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stolar, 397 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
3. Id. at 525.
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While these events were taking place, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was deciding a case in which a Texas district court had held
five attorneys in contempt after they had been subpoenaed by the United
States attorney to appear before a grand jury. The attorneys had
refused to answer questions concerning the names of people who had
paid legal fees to them in connection with their representation of a
client. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America filed an amicus
brief on behalf of the attorneys. The Fifth Circuit reversed the con-
tempt citations. 5
Earlier in 1975, the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding of contempt
against a Nevada attorney who had been subpoenaed before a federal
grand jury and had refused to answer questions about his fee arrange-
ment with a client. 6 An impressive array of attorney associations filed
an amicus brief in the Supreme Court, urging reversal of the convic-
tion,' but the Court denied certiorari.8
The use of the grand jury by federal prosecutors in the above
situations jeopardizes the independence of the bar, presents a clear
threat to the attorney-client privilege, and is part of a pattern that
endangers the civil liberties of all American citizens. These strong
words should not surprise anyone who has observed the Department of
Justice's gross misuse of grand juries in recent years; nor should they
shock anyone who is aware of recent attacks on lawyers by some sectors
of the government.
The first section of this article traces the recent history of abuse of
the grand jury. As noted in that section, the pattern of grand jury
abuse by the Department of Justice began under Attorneys General
John Mitchell 9 and Richard Kleindienst, 10 and under the specific direc-
4. See United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
5. Id. at 675.
6. In re Grand Jury Appearance of Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
7. The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern and Southern California, the
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, the Coalition to End Grand Jury Abuse, the
California Public Defenders Association, the California Trial Lawyers Association, the
Federal Defenders of San Diego, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
the National Lawyers Guild, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the San
Diego County Bar Association, and the San Diego Criminal Defense Lawyers Club. See
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae.
8. Michaelson v. United States, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
9. John Mitchell was convicted on January 1, 1975, of conspiracy to obstruct
justice in connection with the Watergate conspiracy. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1975, at 1, col.
8.
10. Richard Kleindienst pleaded guilty on May 16, 1974, to refusing to testify
accurately before a Senate committee investigating the International Telephone & Tele-
graph (ITT) affair, in return for not being charged with perjury. S. F. Chronicle, May
17, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
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tion of Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian." The Watergate
scandal has revealed that the Department of Justice and the White
House were involved in plans aimed at disruption and harassment of
political opponents of the administration. One notable instance was the
so-called Huston plan, which called for illegal methods of electronic
surveillance, mail interception, and burglary directed against the politi-
cal left.12 It is of interest that at about the same time that these plans
were developed, the Department of Justice began its grand jury cam-
paign, discussed below, which was also directed largely against political
opponents.
The first section of this article demonstrates that there has been
what Senator Kennedy has termed a "twisting [of] law enforcement,"
and that this misuse of the grand jury continues. Following this discus-
sion is a brief description of some recent instances in which prosecutors
and others in government have made attacks on lawyers. The aim of
this section is to show that we face a potentially troublesome time in
which lawyers may be attacked for their politics, or merely for zealous
defense of their clients and steadfastness in preserving client confi-
dences.
It is the thesis of this article that when faced with a prosecutor who
has subpoenaed an attorney in order to obtain information about a
client, a court should give vigorous and forceful protection to the
attorney-client privilege. It is only when the attorney-client privilege
becomes a strong and impenetrable barrier that the independence of the
bar under our adversary system of justice can be preserved. If prosecu-
tors are allowed to use grand juries to subvert the privilege, the erosion
of our civil liberties will have progressed one step further, and an
institution once seen as the great protector of individual liberty will be
that much closer to becoming a device for prosecutorial repression.
Thus, the final section of this article examines some aspects of the law of
attorney-client privilege which are under attack and which, it is argued,
should not be subject to prosecutorial manipulation through abuse of the
grand jury system.
The Grand Jury: From Noble Use to
Prosecutorial Abuse
The grand jury is an institution dating back to 12th century
11. Robert Mardian, like Mitchell, was convicted on January 1, 1975, of conspiracy
to obstruct justice. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
12. Id., July 22, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 10.
England."3 Although much of its history has been romanticized, it is
true that generally its high historical purpose was to act as a shield
between the king's prosecutors and the people. Before a prosecutor
could charge someone with a crime and bring him or her to trial, a
grand jury had to pass on the prosecutor's evidence and determine
whether there was good cause for such action. The grand jury was
theoretically independent of the prosecutor and screened the govern-
ment's case with a close eye to assess its soundness. If the grand jury
found good cause, the person was indicted and brought to trial; if not,
the case was dismissed. In addition to performing this screening func-
tion, the grand jury at times also conducted independent investigations
into government wrongdoing.
The most famous grand jury actions were those in which grand
juries refused to indict when the king, for political reasons, sought to
have his enemies indicted.' 4 Thus, the prevalent concept of the grand
jury in early America was of a noble, independent institution which
stood between both vindictive, politically motivated prosecutors and
overly zealous or mistaken prosecutors and the people.' 5 The writers of
the Constitution were so impressed with this institution that they incor-
porated it into the Bill of Rights. The fifth amendment provides that no
person can be tried by the federal government for a serious crime (a
felony) unless first indicted by a grand jury.16
13. See generally 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACCE 6.01-02 (2d ed. 1975);
Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
701 (1972); Friedman, Grand Jury: Sword or Shield (1972) (paper delivered to
American Civil Liberties Union Conference of Committee for Public Justice, in New
York City, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Friedman] (on file with the author at University
of San Francisco School of Law).
14. One of the most famous instances was the grand jury's refusal in 1681 to indict
the Earl of Shaftesbury. See Proceedings Against the Earl of Shaftesbury, 8 Cobbetts
State Trials 759 (T. Howell ed. 1681); Friedman, supra note 13. In the United States
in 1735, two grand juries refused to indict John Peter Zenger on charges of seditious
libel. He was finally indicted by a third grand jury. Id. at 8.
15. There is no doubt that this general concept of the grand jury is highly
idealized. Grand juries were in fact used politically by the king and by governments in
this country. During the colonial period, grand juries did refuse to indict stamp act
rioters and others. Undeterred, the British governors ultimately secured the indictments
by bringing the cases before grand juries in areas where British supporters prevailed. See
generally Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Am. CRiM.
L. REv. 701 (1972); Friedman, supra note 13.
This idealized concept of the grand jury was, however, the notion that was passed
down through the years, and it was the one which the writers of the Constitution had in
mind. Moreover, as described in text below, this concept has greatly affected the
attitude of judges toward the grand jury.
16. The phrase "infamous crime," as used in the fifth amendment, means a felony.
See 8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACnCE 6.02, n.1, at 6-7 (2d ed. 1975).
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The question raised, then, by this historical vision of the grand jury
is how such an institution could be twisted into an instrument of re-
pression.
As with many institutions, some of the strengths of the grand jury
were also its most dangerous aspects. These aspects, coupled with two
important developments, have enabled the grand jury to be misused and
abused by prosecutors.
The grand jury's strength-its image as an independent protector
of individual liberties-has led to a unique judicial attitude toward it.
Unlike any other element of the legal system, and even unlike any
legislative committee or administrative agency, the grand jury has been
freed by the courts from virtually all requirements of procedural due
process.
17
As a result, a federal prosecutor can subpoena anyone to appear
before a grand jury without telling the person what the subject of the
investigation is or why he or she was called; the prosecutor can ask
virtually unlimited questions of the witness, and the witness cannot
generally challenge the relevancy of the questions. Probably no other
government institution possesses such power. 18
17. See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
"[The witness] is not entitled to urge objections of incompetency, irrelevancy, such
as a party [in a judicial proceeding] might raise, for this is no concern of his.
"He is not entitled to set limits to the investigation. . . . It is a grand inquest, a
body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to
be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the
investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly
subject to an accusation of crime ...
"[W]itnesses are not entitled to take exception to the jurisdiction of the grand jury
or the court over the particular subject-matter that is under investigation." Id. at 282
(citations omitted).
18. Two experienced grand jury practitioners have described the powers of the
grand jury as follows: "Unlike a subpoena used in other proceedings, a grand jury
subpoena does not disclose to the person receiving it the nature of the proceeding, nor
does it disclose the questions which that person is to be asked.
"Rule Six of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes district court clerks
to issue grand jury subpoenas to the U.S. attorneys in blank. . . . No prosecutor need
make a showing, at that time or at any other, that he has any reason to believe that the
witness named on the subpoena has any information relevant to the investigation.
"Federal grand juries enjoy nationwide service of process.
"Nor is there any statutory or judgemade minimum notice requirement.
"Once the witness is within the grand jury room, no effort is made to dispel the
mystery. Present in the room are the members of the grand jury (up to 23) and one or
more prosecuting attorneys. No judge is permitted to be present during questioning or
The ability of the grand jury to conduct unfettered secret investiga-
tions,19 facilitated by the judicial attitude of noninterference, presented a
tremendous potential for abuse. It took two modern developments,
however, to make that potential reach fruition. The first was the
evolution of the grand jury from a more or less independent institution
to an institution completely dominated by the prosecutor.
This development was not derived from changes in rules or laws;
rather, it was a natural evolution which paralleled the centralization of
power in the executive branch of government. As the grand jury ceased
to be a body of neighbors familiar with the area they were investigating
and became instead an impersonal body investigating complicated feder-
al crimes, the prosecutor gained increasing control, since he or she was
privy to the facts, the investigative resources, and the knowledge of the
laws. By 1931, the famous Wickersham Committee report stated:
Every prosecutor knows, and every intelligent person who ever
served on a grand jury knows, the prosecuting office almost
invariably completely dominates the grand jury . . . . The
grand jury usually degenerates into a rubber stamp wielded by the
prosecuting officer according to the dictates of his own sense of
propriety and justice.2°
Since 1931, this tendency has increased. One study concluded
that in less than 2 percent of the cases do grand juries disagree with
prosecutors; and the study's author stated that conversations with prose-
cutors indicated that the specified percentage was probably high.2 Even
the Justice Department has publicly admitted that the independence of
the grand jury is a myth. In a letter dated September 10, 1974,
Assistant Attorney General W. Vincent Rakestraw wrote to Congress-
man Peter Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee: "[Ifn
our judgment, the grand jury does not operate to protect the individual
to any substantial degree ... ."22 Mr. Rakestraw continued, quoting
approvingly from an article by Judge Campbell:
during grand jury deliberations. Finally, the witness is not allowed to have a lawyer
inside the grand jury room while the interrogation is taking place.
"The boundaries, then, are as wide as the United States itself-sometimes even
wider." Winograd & Fassler, The Political Question, TRIAL, Jan./Feb. 1973, at 16, 17.
19. Grand jury proceedings are secret. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide that only the grand jurors, the witness, the reporter, and the prosecutor can be
present. The witness cannot have an attorney present. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
20. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
PROSECUTION 125 (1931), quoting ILLINOIS AsSOCIAnON FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL SURVEY 229 (1929).
21. Friedman, supra note 13.
22. 120 CONG. REC. 11,355 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1974) (letter from Assistant
Attorney General W. Vincent Rakestraw to Rep. Peter Rodino, Sept. 10, 1974).
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It has also been suggested that the mere existence of the
grand jury acts as a deterrent to the presentation of unfounded
accusations by overzealous and malicious prosecutors. Of course,
no empirical data is available to support this theory. Although
difficult to refute for the same reason, in my judgment both logic
and my experience mitigates its persuasiveness. In the first
place, the theory, like all others in support of the grand jury,
presumes the existence of a strong independent body intelligently
and carefully analyzing the evidence presented to it. As we have
seen, such independence has long since vanished under the strain
of outside forces. Moreover, this myth of grand jury indepen-
dence affords the prosecutor anonymity in the exercise of his
discretion. I suggest that the consequence of such misplaced
responsibility for the initiation of a prosecution encourages, rather
than stifles, malintended prosecution and character assasina-
tion.23
In placing this letter into the Congressional record, Congressman Joshua
Eilberg of the House Judiciary Committee noted that the letter showed
that "the [Justice] Department Tecognizes that Federal grand juries no
longer serve a protective function and it further concedes that this
institution has become merely a convenient tool for Federal prosecu-
tors."2 4
One obstacle to grave abuse of the grand jury system remained,
however: the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Al-
though grand juries, at the instance of prosecutors, could subpoena
anybody and ask virtually anything, the witness, under the fifth amend-
ment, had a constitutional right not to answer. The courts have held
that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to
grand jury proceedings,2 5 thus enabling witnesses to block questioning
by invoking the privilege.26
23. Id. at 11,355-56, quoting Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 179 (1973).
24. Id. at 11,354.
25. Blau v. United States, 340 U:S. 159 (1950); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
26. Under the applicable cases concerning the scope of the fifth amendment
privilege, the test of which questions may be incriminating is very broad. In the leading
case, the Court stated that the privilege must be given "a liberal construction in favor of
the right it was intended to secure." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951). The standard governing self-incriminatory statements was stated to be as
follows:
"The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves
support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which
would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a
federal crime .... To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implica-
tions of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
1269
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In 1968, however, the federal government, in order to limit the
effect of the privilege, enacted a comprehensive immunity law. Under
this law, the prosecution, in its discretion, may grant immunity to
witnesses. Actually, the word "grant" is misleading, since immunity
may be imposed even if a witness prefers to stand on his or her fifth
amendment privilege and not testify. Once immunity is given, the fifth
amendment right no longer operates and the witness must either testify
or be jailed for contempt.28
In 1970, the Nixon administration proposed, and Congress enact-
ed, a new immunity law, which provides for what is termed "use"
immunity.29 Under this law, the witness is forced to testify; the only
prohibition against the government is that it may not use the testimony
or leads from it against the witness. If, however, the government has
independent evidence against the witness, a prosecution is permitted.
This provision was the first such federal law ever enacted in this
country; it was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1972.0
At about this time the Justice Department, first under Attorney
General Mitchell and then under Attorney General Kleindienst, con-
ducted a major campaign to use the powers of the grand juries. The
Justice Department's Internal Security Division, under the direction of
Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian, spearheaded the effort.3 '
injurious disclosure could result. The trial judge in appriasing the claim 'must be
governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the
facts actually in evidence.'" Id. at 486-87.
The Court in Hoffman also pointed out that the witness is not required to explain
just what in the answer would be incriminating:
"[I1f the witness, upon interposing his claim were required to prove the hazard in
the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be
compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee."
Id. at 486.
Following Hoffman, the Supreme Court and appellate courts reversed virtually all
decisions in which lower courts had held that questions were not incriminating. See
NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD GRAND JURY DEFENSE OFFICE, REPRESENTATION OF WITNESS
BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES § 13.4 (1974).
Given the broad test of what constitutes incriminating questions, when grand jury
witnesses claimed the privilege, the prosecutors could almost never show that the
questions would not be incrimination. Witnesses could by this tactic effectively block
prosecutors' questioning.
27. Act of July 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 216.
28. The contempt sentence is for the duration of the grand jury's term, which may
be as long as 18 months. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970).
30. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). The case was
decided by a five to two vote, with the three Nixon appointees voting in the majority.
The fourth Nixon appointee, Justice Rehnquist, disqualified himself.
31. In a Justice Department internal realignment, the Internal Security Division
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Mardian hired an attorney, Guy Goodwin, to head the division's Special
Litigation Section, which was in charge of grand jury operations, and
the grand jury campaign began in earnest.
82
The campaign has consisted of grand jury investigations of politi-
cally dissident groups, usually those on the left, by United States attor-
neys, initially from the Justice Department's Internal Security Division.
In a typical situation, the attorneys subpoena a number of people
connected with a group, grant immunity to many of them, and then ask
questions concerning their political associations, friends, families, and
other details of their lives. 3 Two observers have stated that these
prosecutors' main goals have been to gather intelligence on the political
left and to harass political activists. 4 Although a specific criminal act
has been the purported subject of each investigation, the questions have
been far more wide-ranging. If a witness has refused to cooperate, he
or she has been jailed for contempt.
The nature of these grand jury investigations is revealed by some
examples of the questions asked.36 During a 1971 federal grand jury
investigation in Tucson, Arizona, the prosecutor said to a witness:
I would like to ask at this time if you have ever been a
member of any of the following organizations, and if so, to tell the
grand jury during what period of time you belonged to any of
these organizations, with whom you associated in connection with
your membership in any of these organizations, what activities
you engaged in and what meetings you attended, giving the grand
jury the dates and the conversations which occurred: The Save
Our Soldiers Committee, the Coalition, the Los Angeles Reserve
was disbanded in 1973 and transferred to the Criminal Division, where it has remained
largely intact as the Internal Security Section. National Lawyers Guild Grand Jury
Defense Office, WrNEss, Apr. 6, 1973, at 159.
32. New York Times reporter Lacey Fosburgh interviewed Guy Goodwin and
wrote an article about him. She noted Goodwin's reputation, even within the Justice
Department, as an overzealous foe of the political left: "Even one of Nixon's own high-
ranking appointees acknowledged in an interview that he was very disturbed by Good-
win's work. This official, speaking only with the assurance his name would not be used,
said: 'hese guys [referring to Goodwin's staff in general] live in a world of their own.
They forget we're civilized people, and they don't understand the whole question of due
process. They believe they're protecting America from bad people and that it's in the
interest of the country to do what they're doing."' Fosburgh, Who Is Guy Goodwin and
Why Are They Saying Those Terrible Things About Him?, Junis DOCTOR, Jan. 1973, at
14, 41.
33. See Donner & Cerrutti, The Grand Jury Network, 214 THE NATION 5 (1972).
See also sources collected in note 49 infra.
34. Donner & Cerrutti, The Grand Jury Network, 214 THE NATION 5 (1972).
35. See Letter from National Lawyers Guild Grand Jury Defense Office to Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 6, 1973 (compilation of
typical questions).
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Association, the Peace and Freedom Party, the Los Angeles
Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights, the Humanistic and
Educational Needs of the Academic Community Organization;-
that is it for now.
36
Before the same grand jury, the prosecutor asked another witness:
"Describe every person who has visited your house subsequent to your
last appearance [before the grand jury] (six months previously)-who
they were, what conversations occurred, who was present, when they
visited.
37
At about the same time a witness before a federal grand jury in
Seattle was asked about all conversations which had occurred during a
fifty-six hour car trip across the country with friends. At another
Seattle federal grand jury proceeding in May 1972, a witness was told:
I want you to tell the grand jury over the last two years every
telephone number which you have had at a place where you
resided, or every telephone number at a place where you have
had access to the use of that telephone.38
There have been more than 100 of these grand juries, with over
2,000 witnesses subpoenaed.19 The objects of investigation have in-
cluded antiwar and antidraft groups;40 the Black Panther Party;41 sup-
porters of the Irish Republican Movement; 42 the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War;43 Father Berrigan and other antiwar Catholics;44 and
Daniel Ellsberg and others associated with the Pentagon Papers.45  In
addition, grand juries have subpoenaed news reporters in an attempt to
acquire information received from confidential sources.4 6
There has been a strong outcry against this abuse of the grand jury.
For example, Senator Kennedy states in hearings before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee:
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10.
39. Conyers, Grand Juries: The American Inquisition, RAMPARTS, Aug./Sept.
1975, at 15 [hereinafter cited as Conyers].
40. See In re Verplanck, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
41. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Bursey v. United States, 466
F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972); Levinson v. Attorney General, 321 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa.
1970).
42. See Meisel v. United States, 412 U.S. 954 (1973); In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806
(5th Cir. 1972).
43. See Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972).
44. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1973).
45. See United States v. Doe, 451 F.2d 466 (1st Cir. 1971); In re Ellsberg, 446
F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971).
46. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (upholding power of grand jury
to subpoena reporter and demand information about confidential sources). The Court
held that the first amendment did not protect against such a subpoena. Id. at 682-83.
See also Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
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The use of "political" grand juries by the present administra-
tion is unprecedented. In a sense, of course, the practice is a
throwback to the worst excesses of the legislative investigating
committees of the 1950's.
In this respect, the Internal Security Division of the Justice
Department represents the second coming of Joe McCarthy and
the House un-American Activities Committee.
But, the abuse of power of the Department's overzealous
prosecutors do not even know the bounds of a Joe McCarthy,
because their insidious contemporary activities are carried out in
the dark and secret corners of the grand jury, free from public
scrutiny.
And so it goes, as the special litigation section of the Internal
Security Division plies its trade, with its small army of grand
inquisitors barnstorming back and forth across the country, haul-
ing witnesses around behind them, armed with dragnets of sub-
poenas, immunity grants, contempt citations, and prison terms.
These tactics are sufficient to terrify even the bravest and
most recalcitrant witness, whose only crime may be a deep
reluctance to become a Government informer on his closest
friends or relatives, or an equally deep belief that the nose of -the
U.S. Government has no business in the private life and views
and political affiliations of its free citizens. 47
Furthermore, Judge Shirley Hufstedler of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated for a unanimous panel of the court that "[ilt would
be a cruel twist of history to allow the institution of the grand jury that
was designed at least partially to protect political dissent to become an
instrument of political suppression."4 s  In addition, numerous articles
have been written condemning this grand jury pattern.49
Congress has responded by introducing a number of bills to curb
the powers of grand jury proceedings. 50 Hearings were scheduled in
47. Hearings on Grand Jury Venue before Subcomm. 1 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 17 (1973) (testimony of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy).
48. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1089 (9th Cir. 1972).
49. See, e.g., Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEo. LJ. 1 (1972); Conyers,
supra note 39, at 14; Cowan, The New Grand Jury, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1973, § 6
(Magazine), at 19; Diamond, Fishing in Ellsberg's Wake, MoRE, Jan. 1972, at 1; Donner
& Cerrutti, The Grand Jury Network, 214 Tan NATON 5 (1972); Donner & Lavine,
Kangaroo Grand Juries, 217 THE NATON 519 (1973); Fosburgh, Who is Guy Goodwin
and Why Are They Saying Those Terrible Things About Him?, Juius Docroa, Jan.
1973, at 14; Goodell, Where Did the Grand Jury Go?, HAIRPERS, May 1973, at 14; Quat,
Perversion of the Grand Jury, RIGHTS, May/June 1972, at 3; Rabinowitz, Reif & Litt,
Repression by Grand Jury, G=ILD PACTMriONEI?, Spring 1971, at 44; Winograd &
Fassler, The Political Question, TRIAl, Jan./Feb. 1973, at 16.
50. H.R. 6207, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 6006, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); H.R. 1277, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); H.R. 2986, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
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late 1975 and early 1976 to discuss these measures. 51 A national
Coalition To End Grand Jury Abuse has been formed in Washington;
among the members are several civil liberties and church groups. 2
Despite this outcry the powers of the grand juries and their availa-
bility for prosecutorial abuse remain. One Congressman, for example,
charged recently that two current federal grand juries were being con-
ducted for purposes of harassment.5 3 The present administration shows
no sign of retreating from the use of this tactic, or even admitting that it
might endanger the civil liberties of our citizens. Rather, the pervasive
justification is that when the administration thinks the national security
is involved, it can undertake whatever actions it deems wise. Thus, in
August 1975, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Clarence M. Kelley, could calmly warn the American people that we
"must be willing to surrender a small measure of our liberties to preserve
the great bulk of them."54 No doubt Mr. Kelley, like Messrs. Mitchell,
(1975). These bills would generally limit the duration of contempt sentences to six
months, restrict the use of immunity, and provide procedural protections for witnesses,
such as allowing attorneys in the grand jury room.
51. The hearings will be conducted by Congressman Eilberg (D. Pa.), a member
of the subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee.
52. Coalition to End Grand Jury Abuse, 300 Atlantic Building, 930 F Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004. Members of the coalition are: American Civil Liberties
Union, National Conference of Black Lawyers, National Emergency Civil Liberties
Committee, National Lawyers Guild, Unitarian Universalist Association, United Meth-
odist Board of Church and Society, Department of Law, Justice and Community
Relations, American Friends Service Committee, Jesuit Social Ministries Conference,
Church of the Brethren, and United Methodist Board of Global Ministries (Women's
Division, National Division).
53. Congressman John Conyers (D. Mich.) has charged that federal grand jury
investigations in 1975 in New Haven, Connecticut, and Lexington, Kentucky, allegedly
inquiring into the whereabouts of fugitives, were used for harassment: "The Government
of course has a responsibility for apprehending law breakers, but it has no responsibility
to use the grand jury as a dragnet to force citizens to talk to the FBI. Nor does it have
the responsibility to harass women in the communities of New Haven and Lexington, as
it seems to have done." Conyers, supra note 39, at 16.
In May 1975, syndicated columnist Nicholas Von Hoffman also charged that the
government was using the grand juries in New Haven and Lexington to harass people
and to do the FBI's work: "What the government is after is a rundown on the lives and
private affairs of people in the women's movement, whether gay or straight.
"The grand jury wasn't created to be an investigative tool. Its purpose is to protect
citizens against malicious prosecution by the authorities, not to afford the FBI subpoena
powers that Congress has conspicuously refused to grant it. This instance of the use of
the grand jury as a chamber of interrogation is less justifiable than most, since all the
defendants in the bank robbery were indicted years ago." Washington Post, Mar. 19,
1975, at B2, col. 3.
54. S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
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Kleindienst, and Mardian before him, thinks that he is in -the best
position to pick and choose which of our liberties are dispensable.
Lawyers Under Attack
Only twenty years ago, during the anti-communist and anti-left
hysteria that characterized the period of McCarthyism, this country
witnessed large-scale attacks against many attorneys. The attacks came
in several forms. First, lawyers who represented people charged as
subversives were themselves attacked. On June 27, 1953, for instance
Senator McCarthy discussed a probe against lawyers who defended
those accused of being communists.55 Some of the lawyers who repre-
sented defendants in the Smith Act trials were subjected to disbarment
proceedings. 56 Intimidation was so successful that in 1953, Justice
William 0. Douglas pleaded that the bar should not be afraid to defend
people charged as subversives. In a speech to the Edmonton, Canada,
Bar in August 1953, he warned that those who defend persons accused
of being subversive should "not -themselves be considered subversive,"
and that "[w]hen the Bar runs to cover, a whole community may be
cowed, and that has happened in some places in the States. '5 7
In addition to the intimidation of attorneys concerning the defense
of politically unpopular clients, there were direct attacks on lawyers for
their personal political beliefs. Senator McCarthy met with leaders of
the American Bar Association (ABA) in June 1953 to discuss with
them the need to investigate lawyers with communist politics. 58  His
discussion bore fruit some months later when, on August 25, 1953, the
ABA announced that it was purging all members affiliated with the
communist party. In the style of the time, the organization also an-
nounced that it had compiled a list of all attorneys who had asserted the
fifth amendment privilege not to testify before congressional commit-
tees.59 At the same time, many state bar associations began to impose
loyalty questions on applicants to the bar and to question the applicants
about their political affiliations.60 A number of suits were brought
when applicants were denied admission to the bar because of their
55. See N.Y. Times, iune 27, 1953, at 16, col. 6.
56. See, e.g., In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953), vacated on rehearing, 348 U.S.
1 (1954); Sacher v. Association of the Bar, 347 U.S. 388 (1954).
57. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1953, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
58. Id., June 25, 1953, at 19, col. 3.
59. See id., Aug. 26, 1953, at 1, col. 1.
60. See Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. Cm. L
Rav. 480 (1953).
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political affiliations or beliefs, or because they refused to answer ques-
tions about their political orientations. 6'
During the height of these attacks, Attorney General Brownell,
under his authority to list subversive organizations pursuant to an
executive order issued by President Eisenhower,6 instituted proceedings
against the National Lawyers Guild.63 On August 27, 1953, even
before instituting formal proceedings or giving those involved notice,
Brownell made a speech to the ABA attacking the group. 64  Despite his
efforts, the Lawyers Guild was never listed as a subversive organization,
and in 1958 proceedings were finally dropped. 65
As the hysteria subsided in the late fifties, the Supreme Court
began to restore some order to the scene with the decisions in the 1957
bar admission cases.66 In opinions by Justice Black, the Court reversed
the actions of bar associations which had denied admission to applicants
because of their past political affiliations or because they had refused to
answer questions concerning their political connections and beliefs.
Although those decisions were undoubtedly received with some relief by
numerous attorneys who had viewed the McCarthy period as one dan-
gerous to civil liberties, at least one commentator expressed criticism of
them. In an article in the American Bar Association Journal, William
H. Relmquist, then an Arizona attorney, wrote, "Communists, former
Communists, and others of like political philosophy scored significant
61. See, e.g., In re Patterson, 353 U.S. 952 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353
U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Application
of Levy, 348 U.S. 978 (1955); Sheiner v. Florida, 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955); In re
Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 903 (1955).
62. See Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 124-30 (1951)
(discussion of the listing procedures).
63. See Weinberg & Fassler, A Historical Sketch of the National Lawyers Guild in
American Politics, 1936-1968, at 1. The National Lawyers Guild is an organization of
several thousand attorneys which was formed during the New Deal by liberal lawyers
who supported Roosevelt's programs and were disenchanted with the Bar Association's
opposition to the New Deal and its refusal to allow black lawyers to be members. The
first president of the Lawyers Guild was John P. Devaney, retiring Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota; among its founders were Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn,
and United States Senator Albert Wald. Id. at 1, 2. Procedural aspects of the attempt
to list have come before the courts. See National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d
552 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 927 (1956).
64. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at 40-50, National Lawyers Guild v.
Brownell, 351 U.S. 927 (1956).
65. National Lawyers Guild, Press Release, Sept. 12, 1958 (on file in Meiklejohn
Civil Liberties Library, Berkeley, California).
66. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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victories during the October 1956 term of the Supreme Court of the
United States ....
Although we have not seen a recurrence of the pervasive climate of
political intimidation of the McCarthy period, there have been examples
of government attacks on legal workers and lawyers for their political
views. For example, in Lenske v. United States,68 the Ninth Circuit
reversed Lenske's tax conviction because it found no basis for the
unique accounting method on which the government had based its
charge that Leske had failed to pay amounts owed. Judge Madden,
who wrote the court's opinion, added a separate opinion in which he
noted that the IRS had a political file on the defendant. The file
included an article which indicated that "he and another lawyer had
called a meeting for the purpose of forming a local chapter of the
Lawyers Guild .. ."6 Judge Madden continued:
I regard what I have recited above [concerning the IRS having a
file on Lenske's political beliefs and activities] as a scandal of the
first magnitude in the administration of the tax laws of the United
States. It discloses nothing less than a witch hunt, a crusade by
the key agent of the United States in this prosecution, to rid our
society of unorthodox thinkers and actors by using federal income
tax laws and federal courts to put them in the penitentiary. No
court should become an accessory to such a project.70
Despite Judge Madden's outrage, the IRS continued to gather political
information. The Watergate investigations revealed that the IRS, at the
instance of the Nixon White House, kept files on 10,000 political
opponents and friends of the Nixon administration.71
67. Rehnquist, The Bar Admission Cases: A Strange ludicial Aberration, 44
A.B.A.J. 229 (1958).
68. 383 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967).
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id. at 27-28.
71. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1974, at 1, col. 7; id. Apr. 9, 1974, at 1, col. 6. On
October 3, 1975, the San Francisco Examiner printed a front page story headlined, How
IRS Fed Data To Others. The article stated: "A Senate panel is exploring the extent to
which personal information about the 80 million Americans who pay taxes to the
Internal Revenue Service goes into a sort of 'lending library' for use by agencies such as
the FBI and CIA and even the White House.
"Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, chairman of the Senate intelligence committee
yesterday opened an investigation into the IRS with a blistering attack on past abuses of
the tax collecting agency, which he said 'is one of the largest repositories of raw
intelligence information in the United States.'
"'One wonders,' said Church, 'how an agency designed to collect revenue got into
the business of defining and investigating political protestors' and other groups.
"He said that before late 1973, names of 8,000 individuals and 3,000 organizations
were put on IRS 'special watch' lists at someone's request for information or meticulous
audit.
"Included were columnist JoSeph Alsop; soul rock singer James Brown; New York
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In addition, some recent attacks have been directed at attorneys
who have asserted unpopular views about the right of attorneys to
protect their clients' confidences. For instance, Professor Monroe
Freedman suggested in a speech that a defense attorney in a criminal
case should be able to put a client on the stand even if the attorney
knows that the client is lying.72 Professor Freedman's position was that
the constitutional rights to a jury trial and to counsel include the right to
a lawyer even when the defendant testifies falsely. Despite the fact that
Freedman had not acted in any way, but had merely advocated his
position in a public speech, Warren Burger, then a court of appeals
judge, sought to have the bar association bring disciplinary proceedings
against him.73  Ultimately, no sanctions were imposed against Freed-
man.
Within the past year several disturbing events have indicated a
stepping up of attacks on lawyers. For example, the United States
Attorney in San Francisco sought to have two attorneys indicted for
helping Timothy Leary escape from prison in 1970. The grand jury,
after hearing Leary and other witnesses testify, found that there was
insufficient credible evidence and refused to indict. The United States
Attorney announced that despite the grand jury's determination, he was
filing charges with the state bar association against the attorneys.7 4 A
more general attack on defense attorneys appears in a 1975 study in
which the Justice Department sought to analyze some of the recent
political cases it has brought,75 including the Chicago 8, Pentagon
Papers, and Wounded Knee trials. The study states that in some cases,
"the purpose of defense counsel appears to be to make the case untria-
ble, by orchestrating the activities of the defendants, spectators, and
themselves to constitute a purposeful interference with the orderly
process of the trial. '7'  The document names a "recurring group of
experienced personnel" who have represented defendants in politically
controversial trials, explaining that the actions of these lawyers were
partly responsible for the large number of acquittals in such trials.77
Mayor John Lindsay; and civil rights leaders Coretta King, Aaron Henry and Jesse
Jackson. Also there were the Civil Liberties Union; the John Birch Society, the Ford
Foundation and the NAACP." S.F. Examiner, Oct. 3, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
72. For a review of the content of this speech, see Freedman, Professional Respon-
sibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 1469 (1966).
73. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1975, § 7, at 7, col. 3.
74. S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 11, 1975, at 4, col. 1.
75. See Department of Justice, Disruption in the Courtroom and the Publicly
Controversial Defendant (Apr. 18, 1975).
76. Id. at 1.
77. Id. at 5.
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The study is particularly dangerous because it attempts to place the
blame on defense attorneys while ignoring the misconduct and disrup-
tive activities of the prosecution and the trial judge. The Chicago 8 trial
is offered as an example of defense misconduct even though the Seventh
Circuit, in an extensive opinion, made it clear that the trial judge's
actions accounted for most of the disruption. 78  Similarly, the study
notes critically that "a substantial portion of the American people seem
willing to believe that the government, at least since the birth of the
'credibility gap' in the 1960's, will itself engage in misconduct in order
to insure that the misconduct of others will be punished '79 and that
"these [politically controversial trials] were lost because they were tried
before juries at least partially composed of people willing to be con-
vinced of government misconduct." 80  Given that two of the most
important cases the government has brought-the Pentagon Papers case
and the Wounded Knee trial-were dismissed by federal judges because
of government misconduct, 81 and that two attorneys general and a host
of others were convicted for their participation in the Watergate scandal
and related affairs, the Justice Department's denunciation of defense
attorneys in the 1975 study is particularly ominous.
A final example of the recent attacks on lawyers is evocative of the
McCarthy years. In September 1975, Representative Larry McDon-
ald82 placed into the Congressional Record, under the title The Center
for Constitutional Rights: Activists in the Struggle Against Our Repub-
lic, a list of lawyers allegedly helping the international communist cause.
The list included former Attorney General Ramsey Clark.8
This history of antagonism toward attorneys in response to their
political activities or advocacy of unpopular opinions should prompt
courts to exercise extreme care to preserve the independence of the bar.
78. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
79. Department of Justice, Disruption in the Courtroom and the Publicly Contro-
versial Defendant 2 (Apr. 18, 1975).
80. Id. at 10.
81. The Pentagon Papers prosecution against Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo
was dismissed by U.S. District Court Judge Matthew Byrne, Jr. on May 12, 1973. Judge
Byrne stated that "improper Government conduct, shielded so long from public view"
had offended "a sense of justice" in the case. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
The Wounded Knee trial against American Indian Movement leaders Dennis Banks
and Russell Means was dismissed by U.S. District Court Judge Fred J. Nichol on
September 16, 1974. In the dismissal, Judge Nichol cited government misconduct,
including deceit of the court by the prosecution, and stated that the FBI had "stooped to
a new low" in the case. Id., Sept. 17, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
82. McDonald is a Georgia Democrat and a member of the John Birch Society.
Id., Nov. 2, 1974, at 12, col. 2.
83. 121 CONG. REC. E4656 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1975).
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An independent bar is necessary to insure that lawyers may properly
protect the rights and liberties of their olients under our adversary
system.
At the heart of our adversary system is the attorney-client privilege.
It is the privilege which gives the client complete confidence in the
attorney, and which allows the attorney to function most fully as an
advocate for his or her client. Thus, it is essential that the privilege be
construed broadly.
The History and Purpose of the Privilege"4
The attorney-client privilege has been an established part of the
common law for 400 years.8 5 The rationale underlying this privilege
has been stated as follows:
In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers
by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal
advisers must be removed; hence the law must prohibit such
disclosure except on the client's consent.
s6
Other justifications have also been suggested. As one court recent-
ly noted, it is difficult to overemphasize the need for trust between client
and attorney, which is the prerequisite for effective representation of the
client.8
7
Moreover, the privilege is rooted in the ethical requirements of the
fiduciary relationship between the attorney and the client. As Wigmore
stated:
The sense of treachery in disclosing . . . confidences is impalpa-
ble and somewhat speculative, but it is there nevertheless ...
[I]t must be repugnant to any honorable man to feel that the
confidences which his relation naturally invites are liable at the
84. As noted in the text, the attorney-client privilege has been part of the common
law since the 1500's. See note S5 & accompanying text infra. Some states have
embodied the privilege in statutes; others rely on common law. The federal circuits have
split on the question whether they should look to the state law or to federal common law.
Compare United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975) and Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) (federal common
law controls) with Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (state law controls).
Rule 501 of the newly-enacted Federal Rules of Evidence provides that for privileges
generally, federal common law controls unless the proceeding or civil action is one in
which state law applies. See FED. R. EvID. 501; Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). In this article, the privilege is discussed in terms of the common law, primarily
as developed by the federal courts.
85. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 87, at 175-79 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J.H. WiGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 541-45 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
86. 8 WiGMORE, supra note 85, § 2291, at 545-54.
87. In re Callan, 66 N.J. 401, 331 A.2d 612 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
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opponent's behest to be laid open through his own testimony. He
cannot but feel the disagreeable inconsistency of being at the
same time the solicitor and the revealer of the secrets of the
cause. This double-minded attitude would create an unhealthy
moral state in the practitioner. 88
This same theme is recognized by the American Bar Association Code
of Professional Responsibility, which notes that both "the proper func-
tioning of the legal system" and the attorney-client fiduciary relationship
require that a lawyer preserve the confidences of his client.8 9
Finally, the privilege is a basic reflection of a moral choice made by
society that a right of privacy should accompany some relationships. In
this regard, Professor Louisell has stated:
It is the historic judgment of the common law, as it apparently is
of European law and is generally in western society, that whatev-
er handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused by recogni-
tion of the privileges, it is not too great a price to pay for secrecy
in certain communicative relations-husband-wife, client-attor-
ney, and penitent-clergyman.
Therefore, to conceive of the privileges merely as exclusion-
ary rules, is to start out on the wrong road and, except by happy
accident, to reach the wrong destination. They are, or rather by
the chance of litigation may become, exclusionary rules; but this
is incidental and secondary. Primarily they are a right to be let
alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly pre-
scribed relationships, from the state's coercive or supervisory
powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdropping.90
For all these reasons, the attorney-client privilege has become a
fundamental part of our legal system. Courts and scholars have
reached fairly close agreement on the general definition of the privilege.
A classic formula is contained in Judge Wyzanski's opinion in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.:91
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the
privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom
the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this commu-
nication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
88. 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 85, § 2291 (citations omitted).
89. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy, ETmcAL CONSIDERATION (EC)
4-1.
90. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 110-11 (1956).
91. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
92
This general definition and an understanding of the purposes
underlying the privilege provided a framework for consideration of two
issues which have been the subject of recent attention: (1) whether the
identity and address of the client are privileged information; and (2)
whether information concerning the fee arrangment with the client is
protected.93
The Identity and Address of the Client
Despite the broad terms in which the attorney-client privilege has
been defined,94 a general exception to the privilege has emerged. As
one court explained:
The existence of the relation of attorney and client is not a
privileged communication. The privilege pertains to the subject
matter, and not to the fact of the employment as attorney, and
since it presupposes the relationship of attorney and client, it does
not attach to the creation of that relationship. So, ordinarily, the
identity of the attorney's client, or the name of the real party in
interest, and the terms of the employment will not be considered
as privileged matter.95
The rationale underlying this exception has been only minimally
articulated. One explanation is that the identity of the client and the
92. Id. at 358-59. Another classic definition, essentially the same is Wigmore's:
"(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived." 8
WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 2292, at 554-57.
Wigmore's definition has been cited in many cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961). A more recent and slightly more comprehen-
sive definition was set forth in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. Proposed Rule
503 detailed what constituted a confidential communication, who could claim the
privilege, and when the privilege did not apply. Proposed Rule 503 was never enacted;
instead, Congress decided not to enact any specific rules of privilege and left the area to
common law development. See FED. R. Evm. 501. See generally H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
93. There are other aspects of attorney-client privilege which have come before the
court recently, most notably the issues of communications between joint clients and legal
lawyers and communications between clients or representatives of the clients and legal
workers or other assistants of the attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d
345 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Jacobs, 322 F. Supp. 1299 (C.D. Cal. 1971). Cf.
In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The text of this article has singled
out for discussion the two areas which seem to be raised most frequently and which
appear to present the greatest potential threat to the privilege.
94. See note 91 & accompanying text supra.
95. Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948), quoting 70 CORPUS
JuRis Witnesses § 502,
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fact of the attorney-client relationship are not matters given in confi-
dence."
A second explanation given for the exception is the need to ensure
that there actually is a client. As the court in an early case observed:
The court has a right to know that the client whose secret is
treasured is actual flesh and blood, and demand his identification,
for the purpose, at least, of testing the statement which has been
made by the attorney who places before him the shield of this
privilege.9
7
The rationales for not protecting the client's identity make sense in
the limited situation in which the information is needed in order to
proceed against the attorney, and the client will not be harmed by the
disclosure. For example, in Mauch v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue98 an attorney charged with tax evasion was asked to explain the
source of unreported money deposited in his bank account. The attor-
ney refused, claiming that the money had come from clients. In this
circumstance, it might be reasonable to force the attorney to reveal the
names of the clients, as disclosure is necessary to establish whether there
really was an attorney-client relationship.
Beyond this limited situation, however, the justifications for com-
pelling disclosure of a client's identity are not persuasive, and their
weakness has not escaped the attention of the courts. For example, the
court in Mauch noted, "Their reasoning is rather too general and not
impressive, based as it is on some idea that the privilege does not apply
to the creation of the relation. .. ."' In addition, some courts, while
recognizing the exception, have stated that it does not necessarily apply
in all circumstances. 00
Beginning -in 1960, a line of federal cases has severely limited the
identity exception to the privilege. The initial case was Baird v.
Koerner. 10 Baird, an attorney, was contacted by another lawyer, who
96. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963).
97. United States v. Lee, 107 F. 702, 704 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1901).
98. 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940).
99. Id. at 556.
100. See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962). "The fact
that an attorney-client relationship has arisen and the specific authorization for its
creation are not, generally speaking, privileged subjects." National Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Aetna Cas. Co., 384 F.2d 316, 317 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1967). "In the absence of unusual
circumstances, the fact of a retainer, the identity of the client, the conditions of
employment and the amount of the fee do not come within the privilege of the attorney-
client relationship." In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 905 (1969).
101. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
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represented a group of taxpayer clients. The attorney told Baird that
the clients had discovered unpaid taxes and wanted to send the tax
amounts to the government anonymously in order to protect themselves
in any future IRS investigations or actions. Accordingly, the attorney
delivered to Baird approximately $12,000; Baird then sent the IRS a
cashier's check for that amount, accompanied by a letter 0 2 requesting
that the money be deposited in the IRS fund for unidentified collections.
Not surprisingly, the IRS issued a summons to Baird demanding that he
reveal the names of the taxpayers or, if he did not know their names, the
name of the attorney who had contacted him. Baird refused to answer
the questions, asserting the attorney-client privilege. The government
successfully urged in the trial court that Baird be held in contempt,
arguing that the identity exception to the privilege applied. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, stating:
Confidential communications between client and attorney
were privileged under common law. . . .. The doctrine is based
on public policy. While it is the great purpose of law to ascertain
the truth, there is the countervailing necessity of insuring the right
of every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one
having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice ....
This assistance can be made safely and readily available only
when the client is free from the consequences of apprehension of
disclosure by reason of the subsequent statements of the skilled
lawyer.
The government recognizes this general rule, but urges that it
does not apply to the identity of the client ....
In the instant case, a disclosure of the persons employing
the attorney-appellant would disclose the persons paying the
tax ....
...If the identification of the client conveys information
which ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual privi-
leged communication between attorney and client, then the privi-
lege should extend to such identification in the absence of other
factors. 03
Five years later, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits followed the
opinion in Baird.04 The Second and Tenth Circuits have similarly
102. The letter was reprinted in full in the court's opinion. Id. at 626.
103. Id. at 629-30, 632. The "other factors" referred to in the court's holding were
stated to be: "(a) the commencing of litigation on behalf of the client where he
voluntarily subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the court; (b) an identification
relating to an employment by some third person, not the client nor his agent; (c) an
employment of an attorney with respect to future criminal or fraudulent transactions;
(d) the attorney himself being a defendant in a criminal matter." Id. at 632.
104. Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Harvey,
349 F.2d 900, 906 (4th Cir. 1965).
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recognized the Baird line of cases as creating a limitation on the identity
exception to the privilege.10 5
Recently, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jones'08 explicitly
followed Baird. In Jones, five lawyers in Texas were subpoenaed
before a federal grand jury and asked questions concerning the source of
fees paid to them on behalf of a client and bond money for the client.
The attorneys were held in contempt for refusing to answer, but the
Fifth Circuit reversed. The court noted that Baird and its progeny
stood for the proposition that any questions concerning the identity of a
client or the nature of the attorney-client relationship would be privi-
leged if the answers could be used against the client.
10 7
In addition to these cases recognizing the privilege as applied to the
identity of the client, a recent case has held that the address of the client
is also privileged. In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stolar'08 concerned an
attorney who was subpoenaed before a federal grand jury after refusing
to reveal the address of a client the FBI was trying to interview. The
district court quashed the subpoena, stating:
Sheperd [the client] was aware that he was being sought for
questioning by the FBI-although apparently not in connection
with any claimed crime on his part. He was not disposed to
reveal his whereabouts to that agency. When Sheperd tele-
phoned Stolar ,[the attorney] he made known his misgivings and
sought counsel with respect to his legal rights. Stolar agreed to
provide such legal advice. During the course of that conversation
Sheperd gave the attorney his telephone number. As part of the
attorney-client discussions which thereafter took place Sheperd
also disclosed his home address and the name of the place where
he was employed. The Court is of the opinion that the informa-
tion sought was communicated to the attorney confidentially and
solely for the purpose of receiving legal advice. Under the
circumstances Sheperd had a legitimate basis to expect that such
information disclosed to his attorney was made in confidence and
would not be revealed. Legal advice that an individual may
decline to be interviewed by the FBI will hardly be meaningful if
the attorney at the behest of the FBI may then be compelled to
disclose the very information which the client has legally sought to
105. 'This is not a case like Tillotson v. Boughner . . . where response to the
summons would have revealed the identity of an unknown client." United States v.
Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974). 'To be sure, there may be circum-
stances under which the identification of a client may amount to the prejudicial
disclosure of a confidential communication, as where the substance of a disclosure has
already been revealed but not its source." Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637
(2d Cir. 1965). The Third Circuit and D.C. Circuit have also stated the identity
exception in somewhat limited terms. See note 100, supra.
106. 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
107. Id. at 672.
108. 397 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
conceal. If it be urged that including such information under the
umbrella of the attorney-client privilege may unduly hamper a
lawful investigation, the answer is that other methods of obtaining
the information sought must be found short of converting an
attorney into an unwilling informant.10 9
The reasoning in this decision is sound. Although only one early
case specifically extended the identity exception to the privilege to
include the address of the client, 1 0 it follows from the Baird line of
cases that such information would be privileged if disclosure could harm
the client.
In sum, a number of circuits now recognize that the identity
exception to the privilege is limited to those situations in which revela-
tion of the client's identity would not help the government incriminate
the client. This interpretation seems consistent with the purposes be-
hind the privilege.' 1 ' The courts should thus be firm in guarding
against misuse of the grand jury designed to eviscerate the attorney-
client privilege." 2 In this regard, federal prosecutors should be prohib-
ited from subpoenaing lawyers to appear before the grand jury simply to
facilitate the government's investigation of a case.
Fee Arrangements
Along with the identity exception to the privilege, courts have held
that information concerning the fee arrangement with an attorney is not
privileged."' As with the identity exception, the exception for fee
109. Id. at 524.
110. See United States v. Lee, 107 F. 302 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1901).
111. See text accompanying notes 85-93 supra.
112. This article is concerned only with the attorney-client privilege challenge to
such subpoenas. Challenges can also be based on: (1) the lawyer's assertion that the
subpoena constitutes abuse of grand jury process (using the grand jury to do the work of
the prosecutor or investigative agency) (see, e.g., United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270
(1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Fisher, 455 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1972); Durbin v.
United States, 221 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1954); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stolar, 397
F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); NATIONAL LAWYERS GuiLD DEFENSE OFFIcE, REPRE-
SENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES §§ 9.1-9.7 (1974)); (2) the
lawyer's assertion of the client's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
(see, e.g., United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963)); and (3) the lawyer's
assertion of the client's sixth amendment right to counsel in a criminal case (see, e.g., In
re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (2d
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1944); Mauch v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940); United States v. Lee, 107 F. 702 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1901).
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arrangements appears to be based on the notion that such matters are
not part of the confidences between attorney and client, and that
"[a]bsent confidentiality, -the privilege does not apply." '114
It should be noted that some courts which announce a "fee excep-
tion" to the privilege have expressed difficulty with the idea that fee
arrangements are outside the area of communications between attorney
and client. In one leading case, for example, the court stated: "The
privilege is limited to confidential communications, and a retainer is not
a confidential communication, although it cannot come into existence
without some communication between the attorney and the-at that
stage prospective-client." 1 5
The same considerations which govern the identity exception"16
should control in considering fee arrangements; because of the similarity
of reasoning no extensive discussion will be presented in this section.
Like the issue of client identity to which it is closely related, the matter
of fee arrangements should be privileged if disclosure of the information
would operate to the prejudice of the client." 7 The Fifth Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit have recently considered this issue, arriving at opposite
conclusions." 8
On October 17, 1974, an attorney in Nevada was subpoenaed by a
federal grand jury and ordered by the district judge to answer questions
concerning his representation of a client. The questions referred to fee
arrangements with the client herself, fee arrangements with others on
the client's behalf, and funds received for representation of the client." 9
The attorney was held in contempt for refusing to answer the
questions, and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's order, no-
ting:
114. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974).
115. United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1944).
116. See notes 94-112 & accompanying text supra.
117. This section deals with the privilege as it protects information concerning fee
arrangements. A related area not discussed in this article involves the attorney, at the
client's direction, making a money arrangement, such as an arrangement to send a check
to someone for the client. Several courts have held that when the attorney carries out
such actions, the attorney is acting not in the capacity of legal advisor, but rather simply
as ministerial messenger, and thus that the actions are not privileged. See, e.g., United
States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459
(6th Cir. 1968); McFee v. United States, 206 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953). These
decisions seem questionable, especially in light of the Baird line of cases. See notes 101-
08 supra.
118. United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury
Appearance of Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 970
(1975).
119. 511 F.2d at 885-86.
There are strong policy reasons why the existence of an
attorney-client relationship, including the fee arrangment, should
not be privileged absent incriminating circumstances . . . . The
courts have inherent power to regulate the bar. The courts have
the right to inquire into fee arrangements both to protect the
client from excessive fees and to assist an attorney in collection of
his fee, but more importantly, the court may inquire into fee
arrangements to protect against suspected conflicts of interest.
When an attorney is paid by someone other than his client to
represent that client there is a real and present danger that the
attorney may in actuality be representing not the interest of his
client, but those of his compensator. Not only does the client
have a right to know who is paying his attorney, but the court
retains the right to satisfy itself that no conflict exists and that the
attorney is fulfilling his duty of loyalty to his client. 1
20
In this case, however, the grand jury was not investigating excessive
charges of fees by the attorney, nor was it considering his possible
conflict of interest. Had either of these issues been present, it might
have made sense to hold that the matters were not privileged, at least if
the information was not also to be used against the client. 2 ' As
pointed out by Judge Merrill in his dissent, the information sought was
undoubtedly aimed at the client and could have been used against her:
I can conceive of no purpose for seeking the information
covered by the questions in issue except to show a connection
between Miss Sibson and some unknown person thought to have
referred her to Michaelson and to have undertaken to pay his fee.
If such connection be relevant, one may expect that some infer-
ence of guilt of Miss Sibson may rationally be drawn from the fact
of the connection. Asking these questions of Michaelson can
serve alternative purposes: (1) if the answers correspond to those
already given by Miss Sibson, the United States may have
escaped Miss Sibson's use immunity by obtaining the information
from another source; (2) if the answers differ from those given
by Miss Sibson, they may serve to expose her to a charge of
perjury. I dislike this reliance upon the attorney-client relation-
ship to accomplish incrimination of the client.122
Despite the urging of a number of bar groups,'23 the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the case. 124
120. Id. at 888-89.
121. In that situation, since the clien't's identity is known, it would be possible to
subpoena the client and obtain the information from the client who, since the inquiry is
being directed at the attorney's overbearing or illegal actions concerning the client, would
no doubt be willing to waive the privilege. Once the client waives the privilege, the
attorney cannot raise it, for the privilege is the client's. 8 WIGMORE, surpa note 85, §
2321.
122. 511 F.2d at 893-94.
123. See note 8 & accompanying text supra.
124. 421 U.S. 970 (1975).
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The Fifth Circuit approached a similar situation in United States v.
Jones,12 5 demonstrating considerably more solicitude for the privilege.
The grand jury in Jones was investigating narcotics and income tax
violations. The attorneys of a client charged with a narcotics violation
were subpoenaed and asked who had paid the client's bail and arranged
for his fee payments. 12 6 The district judge held the attorneys in con-
tempt for refusing to answer. On appeal, the government argued that
the fee arrangement exception should apply. The Fifth Circuit re-
versed, and in a strong opinion enumerated the policies behind the
privilege and the basis for the court's holding that the fee exception did
not apply:
In this case the government sought to compel the relators to
tell the grand jury the names of unidentified persons who had
arranged for bonds and' legal fees on behalf of known
persons. . . . IThe prosecutor had already represented to the
district court that the government possessed "information" about
certain individuals who had paid out money to attorneys in excess
of reported income. In the totality of these circumstances, and in
the words of Baird, "[the names of the clients are useful to the
government for but one purpose." Disclosure by the relators of
the unidentified "patrons"' names would be directly relevant to
corroborating or supplementing already-existent incriminating in-
formation about certain persons suspected of income tax offenses,
regardless of those persons' possible complicity in marijuana
traffic. If relators were compelled to disclose the sought-after
items before the grand jury; the unidentified clients-having
been linked by their lawyers to payments in excess of reported
income (the prosecutor need only produce their tax returns)-
might very well be indicted. In any event, the income tax aspects
of the government's inquiry demonstrate a strong independent
motive for why the unidentified clients could be expected to (1)
seek legal advice, and (2) reasonably anticipate that their names
would be kept confidential. 27
As in Jones, issues concerning the fee arrangements exception and
questions about the identity exception frequently arise together; it
should be recognized that a single approach is applicable to both. Courts
125. 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
126. Id. at 669.
127. Id. at 674. The court in Jones distinguished Michaelson on the ground that in
Michaelson the client had been given a form of immunity. Id. at 670 n.2. The fact that
the client in Michaelson had been given immunity should make no difference, however,
since, as Judge Merril noted in his dissent in that case, the information was still being
used against the client. See note 122 & accompanying text supra. The test should be
simply whether the government intends to gather information against the clients or their
agents, or whether the government is truly conducting a limited investigation of unethical
and illegal conduct by the attorney. For a discussion of the government's potential bad
faith in claiming it is conducting the latter type of inquiry while really doing the former,
see note 128 infra.
should be vigilant to guard the privilege when its purposes would be
served. When the investigation is directed toward the acquisition of
information to be used against a client, the privilege should be ap-
plied. 2 8  Failure of courts to allow protection in such circumstances
will result in increasing instances of what Judge Merrill, dissenting in
Michaelson, termed the "reliance upon the attorney-client relationship to
accomplish incrimination of the client.'
'1 29
Conclusion
Courts should view with alarm the abuse of grand juries by prose-
cutors and the attack on lawyers for their political views or for their
zealous representation of clients. When faced with a situation in which
an attorney is subpoenaed before a grand jury and asked to disclose
information about a client, including the identity of the client and the
nature of fee arrangements, a court should hold that any such informa-
tion which the government might use against the client is privileged.
128. In Jones the court noted that the government prosecutors had been dishonest
with the court in representing the motive for the investigation. 517 F.2d at 673. In a
warning that all prosecutors should heed, the court noted that it would not let the
government prosecutors get away with misrepresenting to or keeping secret from the
court the true purpose of the grand jury inquiry. "[T]he government should not read
this opinion as an invitation to tighten the web of secrecy surrounding its objectives and
the nature and extent of information already in its hands when it calls lawyers to testify
before prosecutorial bodies. The courts in this circuit will be ever vigilant to insure that
they have adequate opportunities and sufficient helpful material in order to rule intelli-
gently on these matters." Id. at 675.
129. 511 F.2d at 894.
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